

## Comparison of Deradicalization Programs in Indonesia and India

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### ABSTRACT

*Terrorism is currently classified as an international crime which aims to pose a threat and fear to humanity. The presence of a deradicalization program is believed to be able to minimize and even eliminate extreme ideology which is the initial cause of acts of terrorism. Deradicalization is carried out for terrorist prisoners with the aim of eliminating extreme ideas and opening the way for terrorist prisoners to return to the basic ideology of a country and deradicalization is also carried out for society so that they can avoid extreme ideas. Each country has its own method, especially Indonesia and India, in its efforts to deradicalize terrorist convicts. However, does the deradicalization method used by Indonesia have any effect when applied to terrorist prisoners in India and vice versa. To see whether the deradicalization program between Indonesia and India has similarities, further observations are needed regarding the comparison of deradicalization programs between Indonesia and India. The method used in this research is a qualitative method whose sources are centered on literature related to the subject of discussion. The results of this research explain whether deradicalization programs in Indonesia and India have similarities and how effective these programs are in efforts to deradicalize terrorist convicts.*

**Keywords:** *Terrorism; Deradicalization; Indonesia; India; Comparison*

### INTRODUCTION

In the context of a constantly changing world, the phenomenon of terrorism has become a complex global threat involving many countries, including Indonesia and India. Technological developments and globalization have opened the door for terrorist groups to spread ideology and propaganda across borders and form a network of transnational terrorism (K. Amin, 2017). This phenomenon not only creates security instability but also challenges the multicultural values of pluralism, tolerance, democracy, and equality around the world (M. Amin & Penulis, 2018). Terrorism events that occurred in different parts of the world, such as the 9/11 attacks in New York and the coordinated terror attacks in Paris in 2015, have left a deep historical mark on the global consciousness. These events not only created widespread repercussions in the countries where they occurred but also served as a warning that the threat of terrorism could spread around the world and affect many aspects of human life. Acts of terror globally involve a series of acts of violence carried out by organized groups with the aim of creating fear and achieving political, ideological, or religious goals (Irfanda, 2022). Many terrorist groups have a specific political or ideological agenda, such as separatist movements, right-wing terrorism, left-wing terrorism, and religious terrorism. Some of them use *religion* as their ideological foundation (Fath Putra, 2024; Zufadli, 2017). Based on the wave theory initiated by David C. Rapoport, 21st-century terrorism emerged mainly from religious terrorism and racial supremacy. The 2023 Global Terrorism Index report revealed that more than half of the deaths due to terrorism are still caused by terrorist groups adhering to religious ideologies. One of the terrorist groups with the deadliest religious

ideology is the Islamic State group, which is involved in attacks that have caused a significant number of casualties (IEP, 2023).

Indonesia, as a country with the largest Muslim population in the world, is also not spared from the impact of the global terrorism phenomenon. The existence of radical religious groups such as Jemaah Islamiyah and Jamaah Ansharut Daulah, which are affiliated with the global group Al-Qaeda and ISIS, creates a serious challenge for the Indonesian government. The first major terror attack in Indonesia occurred in 2002 in Bali, where bombs detonated at nightlife venues, killing more than 200 people, most of whom were foreign tourists. The ideology of global terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda and ISIS has a major impact on the terrorist threat in Indonesia, as seen from several terrorist groups in Indonesia that have adopted their ideology. The influence of ISIS has also spread to small groups in Indonesia. Indonesia is known as one of the countries that sends the most Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTF) to Syria (Kusuma Putra & Eliasta Meliala, 2023). Meanwhile, terrorism in India is a complex, sustainable, and destructive issue. India, as a culturally, ethnically, religiously, and geopolitically diverse country, faces a series of serious challenges related to the threat of terrorism coming from ethno-nationalist groups, extreme left-wing group movements, and terrorism driven by religious ideology. One of the main focuses of terrorism in India is the threat coming from jihadists carried out by groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) (Davis, A., 2021). The terror attack in Mumbai in 2008, masterminded by LeT, was one of the most shocking and significant events in the history of terrorism in India (Vaidya, 2017).

The challenges faced by Indonesia and India related to the threat of religious terrorism and separatism have prompted the two countries to take concrete steps in dealing with the situation. One of the approaches adopted is the development of various programs as part of the prevention strategy. The *deradicalization* program is a prevention program directed to prevent individuals from being involved in terrorism activities or exposed to radicalism ideology. By designing these programs, governments seek to reduce or even eliminate attitudes, views, or beliefs that encourage individuals to engage in extremist activities or terrorism (Fauzi et al., 2023). The main goal of the *deradicalization* program is to change the behavior of individuals who engage in radical ideologies or terrorism so that they are no longer a threat to the security and stability of society. By adopting this approach, the government seeks to build a safer and more tolerant society, as well as reduce the impact of radical ideology and extremism at the individual and group levels. *Deradicalization* is a very important part of the overall strategy for the prevention of terrorism and the creation of a safer and more harmonious society (Yyanto, D.M & P.N Utami., 2021). In the context of these issues, this study tries to understand the comparison of *deradicalization* programs in Indonesia and India. By detailing prevention strategies, *deradicalization* efforts, as well as evaluating the successes and obstacles faced by each country, this research aims to contribute to a global understanding of how countries address the threat of terrorism in a variety of cultural and social contexts. Through an in-depth understanding of the implementation of *deradicalization* programs in Indonesia and India, it is hoped that this research can provide a more holistic view of terrorism prevention and countermeasures, as well as help formulate more effective policies in the future.

### **Deradicalization in Indonesia**

#### **Rethinking *Deradicalization*: Peace Building Construction for Handling Terrorism**

The return of former terrorism prisoners to society is a complex challenge with philosophical and moral aspects involved. Coaching efforts outside of prison require a high commitment to change the condition of former terrorist prisoners with a humane approach and provide protection for their rights as human beings so that they can continue to live a normal and acceptable life by society. The development of moral movements in society has an important role in being the key to the openness of relations between the community and former terrorist prisoners, so that it can prevent the sense of alienation from terrorist prisoners, help them adapt to the behavior of the surrounding community, and prevent them from returning to terrorist groups. In overcoming terrorism and indoctrination, it is necessary to have a moral movement that is directed by involving various parties such as *ulama*, printing and publishing books or magazines, and media. This approach should focus on a new strategy for dealing with terrorism,

given that the root of the problem of theorist is ideological and religious doctrine. Cooperation between elements of society, with tolerant interpretation of religious texts and media participation, is expected to create a strong harmony in dealing with the challenges of this terrorism phenomenon (Khamdan et al., 2015).

### **Terrorist Prisoner Development as an Effort to Realize a *Deradicalization* Attitude**

This article describes the role of prisons in fostering terrorism inmates to achieve *deradicalization*. The research was conducted at the Bojonegoro Class IIA Correctional Institution. They implemented two main programs for *deradicalization* of terrorism prisoners, namely personality development and independence development, as part of *deradicalization* efforts for terrorism prisoners. Routine activities are carried out by inmates, including cooperation with institutions such as BNPT, psychologists, and academics. However, there are still obstacles such as facilities, the lack of officers, and the lack of specialization of officers in dealing with terrorists. Lack of cooperation with other institutions and inmates' resistance to change are also obstacles in achieving *deradicalization* in the institution (Masyhar & Munib., 2022).

### **Deradicalization in India**

#### **Indian Counterterrorism Policy and The Influence of the Global War on Terror**

This article explains how the *Global War on Terror* (GWOT) or called the global war on terrorism affects counter-terrorism policy in India. GWOT is a concept and effort initiated by the US government after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Previously, India's approach to counter-terrorism had yielded little success and was unable to stop terrorism growing domestically or get Pakistan to stop its support for terrorists. The article concludes that India has adopted a localized and defensive approach to law and order that has evolved in response to various terror attacks over the years, but is still very underdeveloped. The resulting frustration has prompted Delhi to experiment more with stronger counter-terror policies, following the attack on the Uri military base in 2016. The terrorist threat facing India has also changed significantly. Global terrorist organizations, such as Al-Qaeda and ISIS, are now targeting the subcontinent, while militants returning from the Middle East are threatening to revitalize the growing Islamist movement in India. The author focuses on Islamic terrorism because India is the target of the US-led GWOT, and it can be said that this is the biggest non-conventional security challenge faced by India. GWOT has influenced India's counter-terrorism in important ways, although its influence is not very obvious and not transformative. However, GWOT has stepped up counter-terrorism cooperation between India and the US, shaping India's terror environment by waging war in Afghanistan and enriching India's counter-terrorism with the US experience (Pant & Lidarev, 2018).

#### **India's Counter-Terrorism Policy against Jihadist Terror**

This article discusses some aspects of India's counter-terrorism policy and the challenges faced by India in tackling terrorism, and provides recommendations at the end. Terrorism, which initially focused on the Kashmir region, has developed into a global phenomenon with sophisticated radicalization and recruitment through social media and the internet that can cover the whole of India. There are two approaches to counterterrorism mentioned in this article, namely criminal justice-based counterterrorism that handles acts of terrorism within the framework of law enforcement, and military-based counterterrorism that sees terrorism as a form of threat to national security that requires a response from the Armed Forces. In counter-terrorism efforts, India uses a combination of both, but India's current national security design lacks a single authority, which ultimately affects coordination between institutions (Kaura, 2017).

There is controversy surrounding anti-terrorism laws in India, especially the *Prevention of Terrorism Act*, UAPA. Then there is the failure to form the NCTC or National Counter-Terrorism Center and obstacles related to intelligence agencies. The lack of qualified human resources in the Indian police force has led to the inadequacy of the Indian police force in tackling modern terrorism. In terms of security, the challenges presented are the lack of trained personnel, outdated equipment, and corruption that occurs in the police. Then there is also the dual challenge of a lone wolf attack, and also a terror cell that can be easily and quickly activated, which is one of the sources of concern for India's security agencies (Kaura, 2017).

## METHODOLOGY

The research method used in this article is qualitative descriptive, where data is taken from literature studies (*library research*) of several literatures related to the topic of discussion. Literature research can examine various reference books and similar research findings in the past, which is useful to obtain fundamental theories for research questions (Muslich Anshori, 2019). This literature research method is used to formulate concepts to overcome the main problem regarding the difference in *deradicalization* programs in Indonesia and India. There are several theories and concepts that can be used as a basis for thinking, including the following:

### Deradicalization

*Deradicalization* is an effort to stem the pace of radicalism, which aims to change or reduce radical thoughts, beliefs, and behaviors, especially in the context of terrorism or extremism. An expert stated that *deradicalization* is the opposite of radicalization, which is the process of becoming less radical. Kurt Braddock defines *deradicalization* as the psychological process by which a person leaves an extremist ideology and is essentially no longer a threat or a diminished threat to re-engage in terrorism (Koehler, 2016). Referring to Law of the Republic of Indonesia Number 5 of 2015, *deradicalization* is a planned, integrated, systematic, and continuous process that is carried out to eliminate or reduce and reverse the radical understanding of terrorism that has occurred. The *deradicalization* program is aimed at suspects, defendants, convicts, prisoners, former terrorism prisoners, and people or groups of people who have developed a radical understanding of terrorism (Terrorism Law, 2018).

According to Horgan & Braddock (2010), in *deradicalization*, there are two processes that a person must go through, namely disengagement (self-discharge) and de-ideologization (de-ideologization). Disengagement or self-release refers to the process by which an individual experiences a change in role or function that is usually associated with reduced participation in violence. This process can occur independently of de-ideologizing because it involves only the cessation of participation accompanied by violence (Horgan & Braddock, 2010). Self-release can occur physically, where an extremist is physically removed from his extremist group and/or means to commit violence; or psychologically, when an extremist may feel disillusioned with his extremist movements (Horgan, 2009). However, self-release does not necessarily change one's thought process. Unengaged individuals may have distanced themselves from violence, but they may continue to contribute to extremism in other ways, such as through the spread of extremist ideologies or playing an inactive or supportive role in facilitating violent extremism. This is only a small part of the overall equation. Detachment can serve as an enabler or avenue for further *deradicalization*, especially if the desire to detach is driven by a change in one's priorities or beliefs (Chernov Hwang, 2017).

De-ideologization or de-ideologizing can be understood as a more complicated process to get an extremist to abandon his ideology, or at least replace an existing ideology with a moderate one. De-ideologizing can also be seen as an attempt to re-introduce extremists into re-pluralization, understood as an increasing perception of alternative options for solving increasingly unimportant, ideologically defined problems that result in an imposition of reflection on the need for extreme measures. This often involves using an external approach to initiate ideological change, which can be done by instilling moderate values or by challenging extremist groups' interpretation of their beliefs (Koehler, 2016).

The 4 stages carried out in the *deradicalization* program are identification and assessment, rehabilitation, reeducation, and social reintegration. Reeducation and social reintegration can be in the form of fostering national insights, fostering religious insights and/or entrepreneurship. The *deradicalization* program is carried out by the government in coordination with agencies that carry out affairs in the field of counterterrorism. The main government agency that functions in dealing with *deradicalization* is BNPT or the National Counter-Terrorism Agency (Law of the Republic of Indonesia Number 5 Years). BNPT has popularized the concept of *deradicalization* as part of its counter-terrorism strategy. The methods used include reeducation, rehabilitation, resocialization, and reintegration (Indrawan & Aji, 2019).

*Deradicalization* is considered an effort to release the ideology of violence and teach values in accordance with *Pancasila* and the 1945 Constitution. The approach used by BNPT in the *deradicalization* process is a soft approach and involves cooperation with the community, certain groups, and individuals involved in the network of radical groups. This *deradicalization* program is not only aimed at terrorist prisoners, but also at family therapy and the general public who are also involved (Indrawan & Aji, 2019).

### **Constructivism Theory**

*Constructivism* is a perspective put forward by Alexander Wendt in his book entitled *Social Theory of International Politics*. Wendt offers an alternative perspective to the realism perspective that is quite dominant in explaining state behavior. He said that international structures and national interests are social constructions formed through interactions and meanings made by international actors. Wendt emphasizes the role of ideas, identities, and norms in shaping the dynamics of international relations. That the state ideology, collective identity, and worldview of each state actor not only reflect reality but also shape reality itself. In the context of *constructivism*, international relations are not only about material interests or the distribution of power but also about meaning and interpretation (Wendt, 2012).

Wendt articulated the main principles of *constructivism* and drew on the philosophical views of Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and Immanuel Kant, who theorized three cultures of anarchy characterized by hostility, rivalry, and friendship, respectively. He calls the moderate version of *constructivism* theory *thin constructivism* because this theory recognizes important points on the neorealism perspective and supports a scientific approach to social inquiry. *Constructivism* theory was originally called cultural theory in international politics, shown by the framework of anarchy influenced by the cultural diversity built by each country, which challenged ontological atomism and epistemological positivism, both of which were traditional theories of international relations that share the same principles. As a social theory, *constructivism* opposes materialism by hypothesizing the structure of human association as a cultural phenomenon rather than a material phenomenon, and rationalism by arguing that its function is not only as a regulator of behavior but also as a shaper of identity and interests. Recognized power still has significance, and recognized human beings remain deliberate actors. Wendt stated that *constructivism* is a structural theory of the international system that puts forward the following core claims (Behraves, 2011):

1. The state is the main unit of analysis of international political theory;
2. The main structures in the state system are more intersubjective and non-material; and
3. The identity and interests of the state are largely constructed by these social structures, rather than being exogenously given to the system due to human nature.

Wendt means that everything has a material basis, such as a body for the people and a territory for the state. However, what really differentiates between different actors and identities are the ideas that mutually possess, such as consciousness and memory. He categorizes identity into four types, namely people or corporations, types, roles, and collectives. The identity of a person or corporation consists of a homeostatic structure that regulates itself, distinguishing it from other actors and entities. While the term *type* refers to a category or social label that is appropriate for individuals who have one or more similar characteristics, such as appearance, behavior, attitudes, values, skills (such as language), views, knowledge, experiences, and historical similarities. Then the identity of the *role* depends on the culture and is strongly related to the perception of others. Role identities do not rely on intrinsic attributes, but rather other attributes. Lastly, collective identity is the logical result of a person's relationship with another person, known as identification. Collective identity includes a unique amalgamation of role identities and types, which has a causal impact that encourages actors to incorporate the interests of others into part of their personal interests (Mengshu, 2020; Wendt, 2012).

When associated with comparative studies of *deradicalization* programs, the *constructivism* approach can provide a framework that can help understand the differences in the program's approach and outcomes. Wendt said that national identity and worldview have an important role in shaping a country's foreign policy and a country's security. Therefore, *constructivism* can help analyze how national identity and understanding of radicalism shape the *deradicalization*

program between Indonesia and India. Through the *constructivist* approach, it can explain how social norms and values can affect the formation and implementation of *deradicalization* programs.

This program will not only reflect the interests of security but also the values that the people and governments of each country believe in. *Constructivism* can provide a foundation for understanding how ideologies, both radical and moderate, will be interpreted and faced by the government and society in efforts to *deradicalize* programs. Through *constructivism*, we can understand how the effectiveness of *deradicalization* programs can reflect and accommodate broad understandings in the communities involved.

## RESULT AND DISCUSSION

### Deradicalization Programs in India

In 2015, ISIS reached the pinnacle of its power in Iraq and Syria, releasing terabytes worth of propaganda online to radicalize individuals, capitalizing on the growing popularity of social media platforms. Two years later, the India government realized this new transnational threat, which required an entirely new set of tools. Then in 2015, India Prime Minister Narendra Modi appointed Syed Asif Ibrahim, former Head of the Intelligence Bureau (IB), as the extraordinary envoy for counterterrorism under the National Security Council (NSCS) Secretariat. He is in charge of liaising between the India government and countries in West Asia, including Afghanistan and Pakistan, in collaboration with the National Security Advisor (NSA). Interestingly, Ibrahim became the first Muslim head in the IB which is a significant achievement in India's intelligence world, his term of office was extended in 2018, and in October 2019, the NSCS was constitutionally and legally recognized in the government's "Business Allocation" rules. One of its main focuses is developing new counter-radicalization programs to be implemented by state governments and other agencies. The then Home Minister Rajnath Singh has been prioritizing internal security since 2014, and the creation of the new Counter Terrorism and Counter Radicalization Division (CT-CRD) is one of the outcomes accelerated by the emergence of ISIS as a global threat (Sharma, 2020).

According to some reports, the deradicalization model of Saudi Arabia and the United Kingdom is at the forefront of India's bureaucracy and security establishment. However, little is known about the structure, methodology, datasets, community approaches, and local variations and applications of these programs from the perspective of different countries. From the perspective of the EU government, the deradicalization program is a major focus, as it adds an inclusive and non-lethal dimension to counterterrorism, which has been stigmatized since 9/11. Increased counter-terrorism debates and cooperation with countries such as the European Union in the West and the UAE in West Asia could play an important role in this decision to find space in the traditional CT-CRD-led security landscape (Sharma, 2020).

### Maharashtra

The deradicalisation programme is run by the state's ATS (Anti-Terrorist Force), which is part of the ranks of the Mumbai Police. The program was launched in 2016 under the orders of the Domestic Service Union. His agenda included opening vyayam shalas (training centers) in minority areas (i.e. Muslim-centric populations); making the National Cadet Corps (NCC), Bharat Scouts and Guides compulsory in minority schools; and establishing independent media outlets "to provide standard contemplations and values" among youth from minority populations. This is aided by a socioeconomic package with the stated goal of bringing "minority community youth back into the mainstream," by undertaking outreach efforts using education, sports, urban planning, law and order, skills development, women's and children's issues, social justice, and health care. The teaching values of democracy and the risks of dictatorship have been added, especially in the context of Maharashtra. This enriches the country's strategy in countering radicalization led by ISIS ideology. The Caliphate declared in 2014 is considered a quasi-state run by a single man with a strict application of sharia law (Sharma, 2020).

The program carried out in Maharashtra is to put the police force at the forefront, but the design raises concerns. This is reflected in the fact that the mandate of the police involved in the

program includes the responsibility of simultaneously addressing "any feeling of communalism within the troops." This is a problem for programs aimed at reaching out to communities and 'deradicalizing' communities that may already feel targeted, as trust-building is one of its foundational principles. The fact that the police force is expected to provide understanding to its members when executing the program suggests a possible lack of an effective structure, with ad-hoc approaches and improvements perhaps more common than they should be. Another important aspect of the program is the maintenance of a database that goes beyond traditional police databases. The use of technology can be used to measure success and failure, with recidivism being used as a key metric to assess how well the program is functioning. However, the use of recidivism can only be effective if the structure of this program is concretely established and (mostly) transparently available for study (Taneja, 2020).

Most of the information available about the deradicalisation programme in Maharashtra comes from police-controlled narratives, mainly in the form of anecdotal success stories. In August 2019, The Indian Express presented a four-part series on the program, in which the ATS (Anti-Terrorism Squad) claimed to have successfully "reintegrated" 114 men and six women after being influenced by ISIS. ATS also stated that it had given advice to 200 other people. Although the series shows many success stories of interventions and community participation, information is limited regarding the structure and concrete steps of the program. Details such as community involvement, family interventions, counseling, and psychometric tests are not available for public scrutiny. An unnamed police official quoted by the Indian Express said that the existing SOPs had been developed with a practical and trial approach, and the report stated that the SOPs were already in place by the end of 2017.

In addition, the police had the support of Rohan Gunaratna, who at the time headed the International Centre for the Study of Political Violence and Terrorism (ICPVTR) at Singapore's Nanyang University. This gives validity to this program through extensive experience in developing deradicalization programs in countries such as Singapore and Iraq. There are four stages in this program, which involve "candidates" and involve various parties such as families, psychologists, pastors, and the police in accordance with the Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs). Outreach with 'candidates' lasts for five years, with a minimum duration of four weeks. The final stage of the program deals with financial stability, which involves offering skills development courses, small loans, and assistance in starting a basic business. Nonetheless, the depth of financial rehabilitation is not explicitly explained and is shown more through case examples than comparable data to evaluate success and failure rates.

Based on the available information, the plan in Maharashtra appears to be a half-hearted effort. There is a constant merger between deradicalization and counter-radicalization efforts. In addition, institutions such as the NCC do not have a direct correlation with deradicalization from a theological and ideological point of view, more related to disciplinary action. One of the policy problems in the program is the failure to distinguish between those who join organizations like ISIS that are driven primarily by ideology and those who are more driven by an interest in violence. There are many instances in India where ISIS sympathizers are not interested in carrying out attacks in India, but are fully motivated to go to Iraq or Syria. The complexity of public loyalty to extremist groups requires a more nuanced approach to deradicalization, with the role of police and law enforcement stepping back to give space to local government departments, community leaders, NGOs, and other civil society organizations to lead.

However, there is one crucial aspect in which the Maharashtra program has achieved success, which is in encouraging parents not to hesitate to contact helplines and law enforcement agencies if they know their children are involved in or consuming extremist propaganda. Local police officers and law enforcement are often recruited from within the local community or area, so they are considered part of the community. This helps to establish an effective early warning system. However, this process becomes complicated when central agencies are involved, sparking territorial competition and creating an environment filled with panic. Meanwhile, people who have previously received police intervention can be worried, as escalation can quickly turn a case of deradicalization into a case of counterterrorism. Therefore, it is important that deradicalization efforts are not mixed up with issues of criminality and terrorism, especially in

cases where acts of terror have not yet occurred. Until now, discussions and designs on these aspects in the program led by ATS are still difficult to access.

The sustainability of the deradicalization program operating in Maharashtra has been a source of debate in the police ecosystem. According to some officials, the idea regarding this program came from the central government, while the states were responsible for its implementation. Doubts have arisen regarding the basic concept of deradicalization programs, questions that have also been raised in other countries such as the United Kingdom and Belgium. Some officials believe that the "deradicalization program" is ineffective in addressing the problem of radicalization and extremism in India and is largely based on Western sensitivities and influenced by migration issues. In a public speech in June 2018, IPS Officer Shiv Sahai (Senior Joint Secretary, National Security Council Secretariat) argued that the deradicalization model is fundamentally based on the perspectives and experiences of other countries that have different governments, histories, and socio-cultural dynamics.

In the United Kingdom or European countries, the problem is that they face problems with immigrant populations. The immigrant population there has difficulty in the process of assimilation in their society. Immigrants want to retain the identity of their home country, which is not always united with the host country. However, we do not face such problems, because our Muslims are us, they only belong to other religions. We have no difference on the racial line. "Sahai also highlighted the concerns of the India police ecosystem regarding the trend of deradicalization programs from an international perspective". Wherever there are radical elements, instead of direct police action, they take the person to the center of deradicalization, and in many cases, allow the dynamics of society to come into play, which ultimately results in better results. Indian society has a high understanding of the reality of radicalization, so community elders and community institutions play a key role. Therefore, there is no need to approach this issue clinically by opening the statistics at the end of the program. I don't think now is the right time to do that. But this does not mean that we should be complacent.

Sahai's view explains why, despite global claims, the United Kingdom's Prevent program and structure have only met with resonance in New Delhi and the state capital with limited restrictions. The radicalization process among migrant populations in Europe and indigenous populations in the South Asian region has very different perspectives; for example, the concept of "assimilation" is not a relevant benchmark for India. In states like Maharashtra, cases of local radicalization are more closely linked to local issues such as communal tensions, memories of communal riots (especially in Mumbai in 1992-1993), and the impact of community displacement, rehabilitation, as well as ghettoization in specific geographical locations within the framework of the country.

At all levels of society, deradicalization programs often cause divisions. Muslim communities around Mumbai, such as Thane and Mumbra, which have experienced cases related to support for ISIS, feel that the program is uneven in targeting them. This situation has worsened in 2020, with political polarization, the influence of technology, and the spread of disinformation. While some argue that these programs can help guide unemployed youth on the right track, in many cases, there is not yet clarity on what is actually needed. Although this view is anecdotal due to the lack of empirical research, skepticism towards programs run by ATS can reflect a general view. On the ATS side, they argue that a more confidential approach to the program is effective for the agency and the community. In one case, they emphasized that the family was happy because their neighbors didn't even realize that their son was going through the process of deradicalization. This underscores the need for a deeper understanding of the program's approach to society and the role of society beyond the involvement of scholars.

### **Kerala**

Launched a deradicalization program in 2016, and it has largely been successful. Kerala has seen several pro-ISIS cases, particularly in the northern districts with some cases in areas like Kannur, Malappuram and Kasaragod. Including some ISIS sympathizers who successfully traveled to West Asia and Afghanistan in their attempts to join the terror group. In 2016, Rashid Abdulla, a leader of a group of 21 Indians from Kerala, including women and children, traveled to Afghanistan in hopes of joining ISIS. In June 2019, reports indicated that Abdulla along with two

other men, two women and four children were killed in a US airstrike in Afghanistan. Most of the 21 members since 2016 have been reported killed in various airstrikes and bombings, and almost none as part of the battle for ISIS. *Operation Pigeon* or Operation Pigeon, which is orchestrated by the Kerala state police, claims to have saved 350 lives by approaching them before they were radicalized through social media monitoring. The contours of radicalization in Kerala are different, with direct connections through the two million migrants working in the Gulf region locals play a significant role in shaping radicalization specific to the region and the kind of tools necessary for deradicalization of a person. A report on the Kerala program in the Indian press from 2018 showed that Operation Merpati aimed at preventing young people from becoming victims of propaganda by organizations such as Islamic State (IS), *Indian Mujahideen* (IM) and Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) (Kaushik, 2022).

Between the LeT, the Islamic State and ISIS have many ideological disagreements and often consider each other to be opposition. The conflict between terror groups with different ideologies is corroborated by the findings of an investigation conducted by India law enforcement against ISIS sympathizers in India, particularly in the context of the Kashmir issue. In one question, when asked about the lack of ISIS presence in the Valley, the individual replied that the Kashmir conflict is a fight between the India army and confidants of the LeT, IM and other Pakistani-backed groups. Thus, any effective ideological intervention must distinguish between the various narratives of Islamic jihad. Today, it is still a matter of debate in the India context, bringing the issue back to the lack of structural clarity that is so much needed in such a program. It also highlights the problem of understanding radicalization and deradicalization. Radicalizing Islam is not a monolith, and using the same approach and toolbox to deradicalize ISIS sympathizers and LeT sympathizers is bound to fail or produce problematic results. Finally, there is no data available on the topic of how (if at all) radicalization occurs in India's prisons, particularly in theatres like Kashmir (Kaushik, 2022).

### **External Programs**

Beyond the deradicalization program, both Kerala and Maharashtra have different approaches to handling local cases. Of course this has greater involvement from the Central institutions, for example the case of Areeb Majeed of Kalyan in Maharashtra, where Majeed and two other associates, Shaheem Tanki and Aman Tandel traveled to Iraq as pilgrims to join ISIS. Majeed then approached the India embassy in Turkey, claiming to have lost his passport taken by ISIS. He was sent back to Mumbai, where he was arrested. Meanwhile, Tanki and Tandel were later killed in ISIS-related incidents. Majeed was the only ISIS member to return at the time and his case was used as a counter-narrative strategy. His coverage is far and wide, about how he lived in poor conditions and was forced to do menial labor by terrorist groups, while also being subjected to racism by the group. A story that contradicts the daring ISIS propaganda videos available online (Kaushik, 2022).

Scholar Bibhu Prasad Routray, classifies two different approaches applied in India: the hard approach or the *hard approach* for radicals, those who have returned from abroad and may have committed crimes and acts of terror as part of a terror group's plan, and a soft approach or *soft approach* for the misguided, those who may have shown sympathy or professed to support acts of terror or ideologies that promote terror. However, Routray expressed concern over the lack of clarity in how the distinction was made. Ultimately, one of the crucial elements in deradicalization is the development of counter-narratives and narratives that can hinder those who are considering extremist ideologies and groups. For the Maharashtra and Kerala regions, successful cases of deradicalisation also serve as a counter-narrative. Although the approach to at least some of these stories that reach the medium tends to be too simplistic, it seems to be effective. In some articles, there is an attempt to focus attention and embed stories within stories to create this counternarrative (Kaushik, 2022).

There is a real difference between Maharashtra and Kerala in terms of how the counter-narrative is established. While Maharashtrians tend to focus more on family and community, Kerala has a stronger focus on theological perspectives, with religious figures taking a much more central role in the counter-narrative. This reinforces the point made earlier in this paper,

regarding the very variable triggers of radicalization across the states of India as well as in various cases of conflict (Kaushik, 2022).

### **Suggestion**

In the deradicalization program in India, it can be said that the intention and impact they produce as a policy instrument in the face of terrorism and extremism, has become a serious matter. These programs are mostly supported by the central government, while state governments are responsible for their practical planning and implementation. Although many independent initiatives have been launched by the state since 2015, institutionalized deradicalization and rehabilitation programs remain an important part of the strategy in various conflicts, including the Kashmir conflict as well as in countering the Maoist insurgency and other conflicts in the Northeast of the country.

But there are some problems in both the approach of programs and the objectives implemented by the state security apparatus, one of the fundamental problems is that in a complex social context like India, giving the security apparatus (police) and anti-terror infrastructure the flexibility to control the deradicalization program has its inherent challenges. In addition, in order for these programs to be universally effective against extremism, critical improvements are needed.

### **Deradicalization in Indonesia**

The deradicalization program in Indonesia involves stakeholders consisting of state and non-state actors. In practice, the deradicalization program in Indonesia is carried out in Correctional Institutions for Terrorist inmates. There are several Correctional Institutions with the Supermaximum security category that are the location for the placement of Terrorist Prisoners to carry out coaching and deradicalization programs in accordance with the Decree of the Minister of Law and Human Rights (Kepmenkumham) Number M.HH-07. OT.01.01 of 2017, among others, it is stipulated that Batu Prison, Pasir Putih Prison, Lalat Narcotics Prison, Kasongan Narcotics Prison, Gunung Sindur Prison as Prisons and Special Prisons for Prisoners or High-Risk Prisoners, such as in Kedungpane Prison, Semarang (Yuliyanto et al., 2021).

In carrying out the deradicalization program against terrorists, various parties are involved, including the National Counter-Terrorism Agency (BNPT), the Directorate General of Corrections of the Ministry of Law and Human Rights, the Special Detachment 88 Anti-Terror, academics, community leaders, psychologists, religious leaders and students (Yuliyanto et al., 2021). The Indonesian National Police unit Densus 88 AT oversees reintegrating ex-terrorists into society. In coordination with the Directorate General of Corrections and local authorities, the Special Detachment Polri transports inmates to their return addresses. Massive resocialization efforts are carried out throughout Indonesia because of the Idensos team's assistance in the release of all terrorist detainees (Nova & Syauqillah, 2021).

The National Counter-Terrorism Agency (BNPT) is one of the state institutions engaged in countering terrorism and implementing deradicalization programs in Indonesia. According to the Director of deradicalization of BNPT, Irfan Idris, in carrying out a deradicalization program against terrorist prisoners, there are four categories of approaches, consisting of: Reeducation, Rehabilitation, Resocialization and Reintegration (NFebriyansah et al., 2017). The explanation related to the four approaches is as follows:

1. **Reeducation**, which is to enlighten the public about the dangers of radicalism, so that the development of radical ideas can be prevented from spreading. Then for terrorist prisoners in correctional institutions, enlightenment was given regarding the dangers of radical doctrines that deviate from religious and social norms. The goal is for terrorist prisoners to be aware of their actions in the name of jihad to commit violence is a wrong act and is not justified by religion.
2. **Rehabilitation** has two meanings, namely the development of independence and personality. The development of independence referred to in this case is by conducting job training, honing their work skills, so that when they finish serving their sentence, they can use their skills to open a business or find a job. While personality coaching is to approach by having a dialogue with them, so that their way of thinking can change so that they are willing to accept anyone who thinks differently or is different from them.

- 3. Resocialization and Reintegration**, both of these things are carried out by going through the education route by involving higher education, conducting workshops, public lectures, then students are taught to be able to think critically so that it is not easy to be exposed to radicalism.

The four categories of approaches are certainly in line with the theory of constructivism which emphasizes the importance of the role of the state in strengthening state security through the deradicalization program against Terrorist Prisoners. The state is the main factor in determining the actions that are feasible to be taken to achieve its interests. This is because every action of the state is guided by legal and social norms, so in relation to the deradicalization program, the state is obliged to be able to formulate policies that are in accordance with the needs of the state actors implementing the deradicalization program (Nilüfer Karacasulu and Elif Uzgören, 2007: 35 – 39).

In implementing the deradicalization program for Terrorist Prisoners, the Ministry of Law and Human Rights through the Director General of Corrections, has established several coaching programs for terrorist prisoners who are serving their sentences in prisons with the category of Supermaximum security. As explained in the Decree of the Minister of Law and Human Rights Number M. HH-02 PK.01.02.02 of 2017 concerning Special Prison Work Guidelines for High-Risk Prisoners in the Terrorist Category, the guidance that must be given to high-risk inmates is personality development which includes fostering religious awareness, fostering national and state awareness, fostering legal awareness, and psychological counseling. (PERMENKUMHAM NO.40, 2017)

The deradicalization program that has been carried out as an example is carried out at the Kedungpane Class I Prison, Semarang, which conducts personality development and independence development programs. In the personality development program for Terrorist Prisoners, it is emphasized on coaching physical and spiritual health, namely by conducting spiritual guidance such as carrying out religious activities guided by religious experts who have correct knowledge and in accordance with religious teachings, national and state development such as marching skills activities, scouting, general elections and national dialogue to foster patriotic spirit and nationalism for Terrorist prisoners. Then fostering legal awareness through the introduction of applicable regulations, regulations and laws. The last is physical coaching, namely by carrying out sports activities such as volleyball, table tennis, badminton and futsal, so that terrorist prisoners have a healthy and strong physique (NFebriyansah et al., 2017).

Another coaching carried out by the Kedungpane Class I Prison, Semarang is the development of independence for terrorist prisoners. The activities carried out are job training such as agricultural training, welding, screen printing, handicraft making, and fisheries. The job training activity is expected to equip terrorist inmates to have work skills so that when they have finished serving their sentences, they can use the knowledge they have gained to get a job or open a business to finance their daily lives (NFebriyansah et al., 2017).

However, in the practice of existing policies, there are several obstacles and shortcomings. This is related to the lack of facilities provided by the prison, and the materials budgeted to finance prison employees. This can be seen from the reality that occurred at the Class IIA Prison Pasir Putih Nusakambangan and the Class I Prison Kedungpane, Semarang. The Class IIA Pasir Putih Prison, Nusakambangan experienced an obstacle, namely the absence of prison personnel who were certified counselors, to be able to provide counseling guidance to theoretical inmates. Then the lack of facilities is the absence of a special room to conduct counseling guidance. The same thing also happened in Class I Prisons, namely the absence of a special room for counseling guidance for Terrorist inmates. Then another obstacle faced is the lack of personnel in both prisons. This is certainly an obstacle to the deradicalization program because the personnel who handle terrorist prisoners are limited and overwhelmed, in addition to that, there is also the factor of the nature of terrorist prisoners who tend to be closed and do not want to interact with prison officers or with other inmates (Rini & Kurniawan, 2019).

Based on the findings related to the deradicalization that occurred in India and Indonesia, a very significant difference can be seen, namely in India there is no discussion at all about the deradicalization program carried out on terrorist prisoners who are serving their sentences in prison. The deradicalization program is only carried out in the form of visits to the community and through education programs but is not fully implemented, therefore the deradicalization

program in India is still lacking in terms of concept and implementation because it has not touched terrorist prisoners in prison. The deradicalization program in India also focuses only on cross-border cooperation and counter-terrorism, while the problem faced is to prevent terrorist prisoners and their supporters from repeating or committing acts of terrorism repeatedly. Meanwhile, in terms of policy implementation, the deradicalization program in Indonesia has been well structured and based on appropriate laws and regulations. However, in Indonesia there are still several obstacles such as the lack of facilities to support the deradicalization program and the insufficient number of personnel and competent personnel in carrying out the deradicalization program, even though the deradicalization program in Indonesia has been implemented in several prisons in Indonesia, especially those in the category of Supermaximum security. Understanding the factor of deradicalization and disengagement programs in Indonesia consists of socio-economic formation such as religious views, patriotism, and entrepreneurship. Densus 88 also has various instruments to assess the terrorist detainees and ex-detainees on the perspectives of religion, ideology, and patriotism. Special detachment 88 also established various NGOs to support ex-detainees to reintegrate with society, such as Debintal. This is also a successful Indonesian deradicalization program in the Asian continent.

## CONCLUSION

In the face of the threat of acts of terrorism, India and Indonesia have formed their respective special institutions that focus on dealing with acts of terrorism and also carry out various counter-terrorism efforts in accordance with the policies of each country. India and Indonesia also place the *Police* at the forefront of dealing with acts of terrorism and cooperate with the community and religious leaders. The Maharashtra and Kerala programs conducted by India have differences in *deradicalization* and counter-terrorism efforts. Maharashtra tends to focus more on family and community, whereas Kerala has a focus on a theological perspective, with religious figures. Indonesia itself has a special institution other than the police, namely BNPT. The approach carried out is in the form of *Reeducation, Rehabilitation, Resocialization, and Reintegration*. The *deradicalization* program carried out by India and Indonesia has similarities, such as involving the police as the front line, involving the community and religious leaders in handling counter radicalization, and forming a special institution that focuses on *deradicalization*. The main goal of the *deradicalization* program of these two countries is to restore the state ideology to the people involved in terrorist groups exposed to extreme or radical ideologies and also to educate the public on a moderate and non-violent life.

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